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Summary 
In this paper 1 will analyze the economic， politlcal， and social thoughts of 
F. A. Hayek and K. R. Popper. First， the question of what the central 
issue of social science is， will be discussed. According to Hayek and Pop-
per， the chief issue that social scientists must consider are unintended 
results. 
Secondly， 1 will attempt to make clear how Hayek and Popper view the 
world. The key concepts of Hayek's and Popper's thought are a spon-
taneous order and the 0ρen soczeか"respectively. 
Thirdly， 1 must deal with the problem of value judgement. Hayek 
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seems to avoid this difficult problem， while Popper employs a dualism of 
facts and decisions， when dealing with value judgement. 
1. The Central Issue of Social Science--Unintended 
Results 
1. 1. Hayek: Criticism on Natural-Artificial Dichotomy 
In several papers Hayek argues for a natural-artzficial dichotomy. He 
says that this misleading dichotomy derives from the ancient Greeks. 
Under this dichotomy， al phenomena are divided i泊ntωothose which are 
仰 tωuraωα'(Jl and those which are αartz析f斥C官悩1
J d白ar吋dsb防ywhich phenomena are divided i泊ntωothe natural and the α Tげtz析f斥欣C官沿ici，勿ωal. 
On the one hand we can take human action for the standard， but on the 
other we can take human design for it， also. When the standard is human 
action， natural phenomena are those which are independent of human ac-
tion， and artificial phenomena are the results of human action. But if we 
take human design for the standard， natural phenomena are those which 
are independent of human design， and artificial phenomena are the results 
of human des伊.
Thus， there can be three kinds of phenomena (see， table-l). 
1. the phenomena which are independent of human action 
2. the results of human action but not of human design， or unintended 
results 
(1) Hayek， F.A.: The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design， in: 
Studies in Philosophy， Politics and Economics， The University of Chicago Press， 
Chicago 1967. / The Errors of Constructivism， 2 ， in:New Studies in Philosophy， 
Politics， Economics and the Histoη01 Ideas， Routledge & Kegan Paul， London 
1978 / Dr Bernard Mandeville， 4， in: New Studies in Philoso，ρhy， Politics， 
Economics and the HistoηolIdeω 
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3. the results of human design 
* the phenomena， which are independent of human action but are the 
results of human design， cannot exist logically. 
Under the natural-artificial dichotomy， the results 01 human action but 
not 01 human design are c1assified into the artificial， when we take human 
action for the standard. They are， however， c1assified into the natural， if
human design is taken for the standard. Therefore， the natural-artificial 
dichotomy is misleading. 
Moreover， according to Hayek， itis the results 01 human action but not 01 
human design that are the main subject of social science. 
table-1 
natural phenomena artificial phenomena 
human action I independ出 ofhuman action I results of human action 
human de討伊 Iindepe耐 ntぱ加mandes明| 問削tsof human design 
G 
①the phenomena which are independent of human action 
⑦the results of human action but not of human design (unintended resultsl 
⑦the results of human design 
1. 2. Popper: the Main Task of Social Science 
12: 
Popper， too， emphasizes the importance of unintended results. He ad-
mits that the structure of our social environment is man-made in a certain 
sense， and that its institutions and traditions are neither the work of God 
nor of nature， but are the results of human actions and decisions. He， 
however， points out that al the structures of our social environment are 
not consciously designed. 
(2) Popper， K. R.: The Open Sociefyand ifs Enemies， Routledge & KeganPaul， Lon-
don 1945， 5th ed.1966， Vol. I， pp.93-94. 
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“only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed while 
the vast majority have just 'grown'， as the undesigned results of 
human actions." 
The vast majority of human actions cause the unintended social 
repercussions. For example， ifa man wishes urgently to buy a house， we 
can safely assume that he does not wish to raise the market price of 
houses. But the very fact that he appears on the market as a buyer will 
tend to raise market prices. 
Therefore， Popper says that the main task of social science is to analyze 
the uninteηded social repercussio句s01 intentional human actions; or to 
discover and explain the less obvious dependences within the social 
sphere， and to discover the difficulties which stand in the way of social 
(6( 
action. 
2. A Spontaneous Order and the Open Society 
2. 1. Hayek: Market and Law 
The most important concept in Hayek's thought is a ~ρontaneous order. 
According to Hayek， the indispensable factors which enable a spon-
taneous order to grow are market and law (or a system of rules of just con-
duct). We wi1l begin with market. 
(1) Analysis of Market 
(3) Popper， K. R.: The Poverty 01 Historicism， Routledge & Kegan Paul， London 
1957， 3rd ed. 1961. p. 65 
(4) Popper， K. R.: The 0.ρen Society and its Enemies， Vol. n， p.93. 
(5) Popper， K. R.， ibid， p.95 
(6) Popper， K. R.， ibid， p.94. 
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Hayek argues for market in many of his books. But， here， 1 will take up 
only his The Use 01 Knowledge in Society (1945). 
In The Use 01 Knowledge in Socie砂， Hayek examines the meaning of 
planning. He says that in ordinary language the word ‘planning' means 
‘the complex of interrelated decisions about the allocation of our available 
resources'. In this sense al economic activities are planning. 
Therefore， what we must ask is not the question of whether planning is to 
be done or not， but the question of whether planning is to be done centrally 
by one authority for the whole economic system， oris to be divided among 
many individuals. 
This question can be changed into another foロn:which is likely to be 
more efficient， centralized planning or decentralized planning? Hayek 
says that the efficiency of planning depends mainly upon the question of 
which of them can use ‘the existing knowledge' more efficiently. Accor-
ding to him， knowledge can be divided into two types. First there is the 
knowledge which is more likely to be at the disposal of particular in-
dividuals， and second the knowledge which can be possessed by an authori-
ty made up of suitably chosen experts. 
The typical example of the latter is scientific knowledge. But as far as 
the allocation of resources is concerned， the former type of knowledge is 
as important as the latter. We can give some examples of the former: 
1. the knowledge about a machine not fully employed 
2. the knowledge about somebody's skil which could be better utilized 
3. the knowledge about a surplus stock which can be drawn upon during 
(7) Hayek， F. A.: The Use of Knowledge in Society， in: lndividualism and 
Economic Order， Routledge & Kegan Paul， London 1949， pp. 78-79. 
(8) Hayek， F.A.: ibid， pp. 79-80. 
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an interruption of supplies 
If the knowledge which must be at the disposal of particular individuals 
is indispensable for the good allocation of resources， and if we want an efi-
cient economic system， we must choose decentralized planning. But， at
this point， one important problem arises: that is， how can individual deci-
sions be mutually coordinated? Market makes this possible. For each 
person's decisions are coordinated through prices as the measure of scarci-
ty of goods and services. Although each person pursues his own interest， 
the coordination between demand and supply is accomplished by 
market. This coordination between demand and supply is really the 
results 01 humaηaction but not 01 human design. 
(2) Freedom， Coercion and Law 
The second factor which enables a spontaneous order to grow is law. 
According to Hayek， law creates the conditions which minimize coercion 
and maximize freedom. First of al， we must clarify the meaning of 
freedom. 
In the first chapter of his The Constitution 01 Liberty (1960)， Hayek tries 
to clarify the meaning of freedom. He investigates some usages of it. 
1. individual or personal freedom--this means the state in which a man 
is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others. 
2. political freedom--this means the state in which men can participate 
in the choice of their government， inthe process of legislation， and in the 
(9) Hayek， F.A.: The Constitution 01 Liberか， Routledge & Kegan Paul， London 
1960， p.1 
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control of administration. 
3. inner or metaphysical freedom--this is concerned with the influence 
of momentary emotions， or moral or intellectual weakness. If a man is 
guided in his actions by his own will， reason or lasting conviction， rather 
than by momentary emotions or impulses， he holds ‘inner' or 
‘metaphysical' freedom. 
4. freedom as the physical “ability to do what 1 want" or the power to 
，12 
satisfy our wishes. 
The most important and indispensable freedom for Hayek is individual 
or personal freedom. It can， 1 think， be safely said that almost every book 
of Hayek's since The Road to Seゲaom(1944)， directly or indirectly， grap-
ples with this freedom. 
As individual or personal freedom is defined as the state in which a man is 
not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others， we must， 
next， inquire what coercion means. Hayek says that coercion occurs 
when one man's actions are made to serve another man's will. Coercion 
implies both “coercer's threat of inflicting harm" and “coercer's intention 
to bring about a certain action of the coerced person". Even when a man 
is coerced， he does face choices of actions. But the scope of actions that 
the coerced can choose is so manipulated by the coercer that the coerced， 
in the end， chooses what the coercer wants: that is to say， the coerced 
chooses the least painful action. 
We can， thus， define coercion as the state in which (1) a man has such 
(10) Hayek， F.A.， ibid， p.13. 
(l) Hayek， F.A.， ibid， p.15. 
(12) Hayek， F.A.， ibid， p.16. 
(13) Hayek， F.A.， ibid， pp. 133-134. 
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overwhelming power over another person's life that the former (the 
coercer) can derive certain actions from the latter (the coerced) by means 
of the threat of inflicting harm， and (2) the coerced whose scope of actions 
is restricted by the coercer serves not his own purpose but the coercer's. 
Individual or personal freedom can， therefore， be re-defined. When 
nobody has overwhelming power over another person's life， when nobody 
is able to have the intention to bring about certain actions of another per-
son， and when everybody is able to pursue his own purpose， individual or 
personal freedom can be realized. 
Now， we must inquire into how we can minimize coercion and maximize 
freedom. According to Hayek， this end can be accomplished only when a 
certain extent of private sphere is secured for each person， and the intru-
sion into this private sphere is prohibited by public power (or government). 
The extent of private sphere which is secured for each person is deter-
mined by law. Law determines the limit of private sphere. In other 
words， law is a system 01 rules 01 just conduct which prohibit this or that ac-
tion. And this system of rules of just conduct was not constructed by one 
man or one organization， but it has grown through the long history of 
mankind. In this sense， law (or a system of rules of just conduct) is the 
results 01 human action but not 01 human design. 
2. 2. Popper: the Bright and Dark Sides of the Open Society 
(1) The Revolt of Tribal Emotions 
Is it justifiable to interfere with a spontaneous order which market and 
law enable to grow? Hayek's answer is 'no.' He opposes interference 
with a spontaneous order. But there is a delicate problem related to 
this.A spontaneous order grows from the interaction of many people's ac-
tions. This implies that we cannot precisely predict the result of the in-
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teraction of people's actions， and that many people's wishes to achieve 
their ends are often frustrated. Hayek holds that these things create an 
aversion to a spontaneous order and revive the emotions of a tribal society. 
Popper is one of the authors who most thoroughly investigate these 
kinds of problems. His The印'enSocieかandIts Enemies (1945) describes 
both the bright and dark sides of the open society. (Hayek's‘spontaneous 
order' is fundamentally tantamount to Popper's‘open society.') 
1 think that Popper's most important assertions can be summarized into 
three points: 
1. Although man has a strong desire for freedom， under certain cir-
cumstances he is inc1ined to escape from freedom and to depend upon 
some authority. This inc1ination has been the source of totalitarianism. 
2. The strongest proponents of totalitarianism in mankind's history have 
been Plato and Marx. Their thoughts reflect the wish of retuming to 
'the c10sed society'. 
3. It is not necessarily an easy task to reject totalitarianism and to realize 
‘the open society' and freedom. 
(2) The Closed Society vs. the upen Society 
Popper says that Westem civilization originated with the Greeks， and 
that they took the first step from tribalism to humanitarianism， orfrom the 
c10sed to the open society. In a tribal society， orthe c10sed society， the 
customs of sociallife were very rigid and the members of the tribal society 
complied with the customs unconditionally and irrationally. It was the 
(14) Hayek， F.A.: Law， Legislation and Liberty， Routledge & Kegan Paul， London 
1973-1979， Vol. I (1976)， pp. 143-149. 
(15) Popper， K. R.: The Open Society and its Enemies， Vol. 1， pp. 171-175. 
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lack of distinction between the customary or conventional regularities of 
social life and the regularities found in nature that caused the uncondi-
tional and irrational compliance with the social customs. People believed 
both were enforced by a supernatural wil. 
In the society where rigid social customs dominate every aspect of social 
life， there can be nothing really equivalent to moral problems.Of course， a 
member of a tribe sometimes needs great heroism and endurance in order 
to act in accordance to those social customs. But he will rarely find 
himself in the position of doubting how he ought to act， because the right 
action is always determined by custom. 
In the closed society individuals are related to each other by concrete 
physical relations such as ‘touch'‘smell'， and ‘sight'. On the other hand， 
in the open society people are regulated by such abstract social relation-
ships as‘division of labor' and ‘prices'. A person's life decisively depends 
upon the actions of others whom he has never seen. An event which hap-
pens to occur on the opposite side of the earth may cause his ruin. People 
have gradually lost ‘intimate personal contacts'. Because of this， the 
number of people in our modern societies who live in anonymity and suffer 
from isolation has been increasing. 
Accoding to Popper， the transition from the closed to the open society is 
one of the deepest revolutions through which mankind has passed. This 
revolution is stil at the beginning stage， and many people may want to 
return to the closed society. But those， who are determined to devote 
themselves to the ideal of the open society， must bear the strain and 
uneasiness which the breakdown of the closed society creates. They 
must endeavor to be rational， torestrain at least some of their emotions， to
(16) Popper， K. R.， ibid， p.175. 
(17) Popper， K. R.， ibid， p.176. 
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look after themselves， and to accept responsibilities. 
There are only two ways， when we face the shock of this transitional 
period. The first is the trial of returning to the closed society and the 
savagery related to it. The second is the gradual progress toward the 
open society under the pressure of uneasiness and uncertainty. Popper 
says: 
“if we wish to remain human， then there is only one way， the way into 
the open society. We must go on into the unknown， the uncertain 
and insecure， using what reason we may have to plan as well as we can 
for both security and freedom." 
3. Value Judgement 
3.1. Hayek: Just and Good 
Hayek opposes almost every interference with market. He thinks that 
interference with market gradually distorts a spontaneous order. The in-
tensity of his opposition to interference with market reachs its peak when 
income redistribution comes under discussion. 
(1) Opposition to Income Redistribution 
Hayek's opposition to income redistribution consists of two arguments. 
First， he insists that the word ‘just' cannot be applied to a spontaneous 
order. On the one hand he says that only human conduct can be called 
just or unjust and that a bare fact， or a state of affairs which nobody can 
change， may be good or bad， but not just or unjust. On the other， as we 
have seen in 2.1.， a spontaneous order which market and law enable to 
(18) Popper， K. R.， ibid， p.201. 
(19) Hayek， F.A.: Law， Legislation and Liberty， Vol. Il， p. 31. 
34 第14巻第3号(経済学・経営学編)
grow is the results of human action but not of human design. Therefore， 
according to Hayek， ifsomebody tries to apply the word just (or unjust) to 
the income distribution under a certain spontaneous order， he makes a 
category mistake: that is to say， as long as market works， unjust income 
distribution cannot exist. 
Even if there can be no unjust income distribution， there can be bad in-
come distributions. But Hayek seems to oppose even the trial of transfor-
ming a bad income distribution into a good income distribution. He 
thinks that the trial to bring about a good income distribution often causes 
unintended bad results. This is his second argument. The word unjust 
applied to the income distribution is a category mistake. Moreover， there 
is no consensus about good income distribution among people. If， under 
these circumstances， somebody pursues a good income (re)distribution， 
the goal is set so that his ideal of the good income distribution can be ac-
complishd. But other people may oppose his ideal. If disagreements of 
the ideal 'of the good income distribution persist， and if each person pur-
sues his own ideal， at least according to Hayek， either totalitarianism， 
where somebody's ideal is forced upon other people， or disorder， where 
several ideals conflict and no solution can be found， will arise. 
(2) A Good or Bad Society 
1 cannot help remembering the impression which 1 had when 1 read 
Hayek'sηze Constitution of Liberty more than ten years ago. In Part 1 
and Part n he dealt with freedom， coercion， and law， etc. 1 felt， and feel 
even now， his arguments to be consistent and convivcing. But Part m， 
where he criticized various policies of the Welfare State， seemed， atleast 
to me， tobe erratic and to lack convincing power. After that， 1 came to 
think that 1 can not rely on Hayek's argument when the question of what 
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kind of policies ought to be employed comes under discussion. 
Imagine' a society where ‘a system of rules of just conduct' is strictly 
observed， and private property， free transaction on market， and freedom 
of speech are secured， while a small minority of the population enjoys a ex-
troadinarily extravagant way of life at the cost of the majority's poverty 
and misery. I think that this kind of society is an absolutely bad society. 
But as long as we follow Hayek's argument， we can hardly try to transform 
a bad society into a good society. 
We must maintain justice and freedom， but at the same time we must， I 
think， endeavor to realize a better society than the present one. 
3. 2. Popper: a Dualism of Facts and Decisions and 
Piecemeal Social Engineering 
(1) A Dualism of Facts and Decisions 
Examining the meaning of the word ‘just' cannot， by itseU， produce a 
real solution to the difficult problem concerning income distribution. 
Under certain circumstances we must judge whether an income distribu-
tion is good or bad. In this context， I think it is helpful to investigate Pop-
per's dualism of facts and decisions. 
He says: (1) norms and normative laws can be made and changed by 
man， more especially， by a decision or convention to observe them or to 
alter them; (2) our decisions must be compatible with the naturallaws (in-
cluding those of human physiology and phychology)， ifthey are ever to be 
carried into effect; (3) but any decision cannot be logically derived from 
facts. 
(20) Popper， K.R.: The Ope抑 Societyand iぉEnemies，Vol. 1， p.61. 
伊1) Popper， K.R.， ibid， p.62 
似) Popper， K.R.， ibid， pp.62-63. 
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Popper emphasizes the impossibility of reducing decisions to facts. Ac-
cording to his dualism， norms and normative laws are determined by the in-
teraction between decisions and facts. 
A dualism of facts and decisions has two difficulties. First， when we 
say that norms and normative laws are made and changed by a decision (or 
decisions)， whose decision will control the changes in norms and normative 
laws?; or in other words， ifthere are differences between people's deci-
sions， whose decision should dominate? This question could lead to the 
problem of relativism. Popper says: 
“It must， ofcourse， be admitted that the view that norms are conven-
tional or artificial indicates that there will be a certain element of ar-
bitrariness involved， i.e. that there' may be different systems of 
norms between which there is not much to choose (a fact that has been 
duly emphasized by Protagoras). But artificiality by no means im-
plies ful arbitrariness." 
1 think that Popper's argument concerning relativism of value is in-
complete. We must give much more careful consideration to it. 1 plan to 
inquire further into it in another paper. 
The second difficulty of a dualism of facts and decisions is the aversion 
to it. Decision and responsibility are indivisible. When we decide， we 
must take responsibility， which puts us under strain. This aversion stems 
from the same root as the aversion to the open society. 
“we may perhaps discern two main tendencies which stand in the way 
of adopting a critical dualism [i. e.， a dualism of facts and decisions]. 
(23) Popper， K.R.， ibid， p.65. 
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The first is a general tendency towards monism， that is to say， 
towards the reduction of norms to facts. The second lies deeper， and 
it possibly forms the background of the first. It is based upon our 
fear of admitting to ourselves that the responsibility for our ethical 
decisions is entirely ours and cannot be shifted to anybody else; 
(24: 
neither to God， nor to nature， nor to society， nor to history." 
(2) Piecemeal Social Engineering 
1 think that Popper's political ideals are liberalism and 
humanitarianism. It is desirable for everybody to gain as much freedom 
as possible. But freedom must not be unlimited. Because freedom 
defeats itself， ifit is unlimited; that is to say， unlimited freedom means that 
a strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his 
freedom. 
Popper advocates ‘piecemeal social engineering' as the way of social 
reform to accomplish his ideals. In order to understand what this really 
means， we must investigate four concepts; (i )historicism， (註)social
engineering， (t丘)Utopianapproach， and (iv )piecemeal approach. 
①Historicism vs.Social Engineering 
First， we begin with contrasting historicism and social engineering. Ac-
cording to historicism， man cannot alter the laws of historical destiny， 
since al his plans and actions are only means by which the inexorable laws 
of development shape his historical destiny. On the other hand， the social 
engineer does not ask any questions about the historical destiny of man. 
He believes that man is the master of his own destiny and that， inaccor-
(24) Popper， K.R.， ibid， p.73. 
(25) Popper， K.R.， ibid， pp.21-23. 
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dance with our aims， we can influence or change the future of man. 
The historicist is inclined to look upon social institutions mainly from the 
point of view of their history， i.e. their origin， their development， and 
their present and future significance. On the other hand， the social 
engineer will not take much interest in the origin of institutions， orin the 
original intentions of their founders. Rather， he will put the problem like 
this. If such and such are our aims， isthis institution well designed and 
organized to serve them? 
The insurance institution will serve as an example. The social engineer 
wi1l not worrγabout the question of whether insurance originated as a 
profit-seeking business; or whether its historical mission is to serve the 
commonweal. But he may offer a criticism of certain insurance institu司
tion， showing how to increase their profit， or how to increase the benefit 
they render to the public. And he will suggest ways in which they could 
be made more efficient in serving one end or the other. 
Popper resolutely rejects historicism， because， as we have seen， man can 
change norms and therefore institutions. 
① Utopian Approach vs.Piecemeal Approach 
Let's turn to the Utopian and piecemeal approach. 
Popper points out the characteristics of the Utopian approach of social 
reform. Those who hold to the Utopian approach think as follows: (1) any 
rational action must have a certain end; (2) it is rational in the same degree 
as it pursues its end consciously and consistently， and as it determines its 
means according to this end; (3) we must be careful to determine our real 
or ultimate ends; (4) these principles， ifapplied to the realm of political ac-
tivities， demand that we must determine our ultimate political end， orthe 
(26) Popper， K.R.， ibid， pp.157-159 
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Ideal State， before taking any practical action. 
On the other hand， those who adopt the piecemeal approach， first of al， 
search for a method with which to fight against the greatest and most 
urgent evils of society， rather than search for its ultimate end. They may 
or may not have blueprints of a good society. But their blueprints are 
comparatively simple; blueprints for such single institutions as health and 
unemployment insurance， or arbitration courts， or depression fighting 
budgeting， or the educational system. Moreover under the piecemeal ap-
proach， man can easily respond to 'the unintended social repercussions of 
intentional human actions (see， 1.2.)'. 
Popper says that the Utopian approach is al the more dangerous， becau-
se it is more cogent than the piecemeal approach. The Utopian approach 
entails two grave difficu1ties. 
1. Can the ultimate end (or ends) at which al actions are aimed be deter-
mined? (Determination of the u1timate end is much more difficult than 
the specification of urgent social evils.) 
2. Can a large-scale social reform on the basis of the Utopian approach 
respond to the unintended social repercussions? 
(A large-scale social reform necessarily causes various kind of repercus-
sions.Predicting al these repercussions previously is impossible.) 
① A version to Piecemeal Social Engineering 
Popper rejects historicism and endorses social engineering. He also 
refutes the Utopian approach and instead. advocates the piecemeal ap-
proach. But the piecemeal social engineering proposed by Popper is not 
necessarily a popular one. The solution of more important problems 
seems to be postpone. and every time man faces a new problem he must 
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make a decision which is not always easy. The historicist denies that man 
can change the course of history， while he can incite the masses by inspir-
ing them a belief in a bright future. Moreover， he does not suffer from 
decision making， because he need not decide which way mankind should 
take. But we cannot predict the future of history， and cannot， therefore， 
promise the bright future previously mentioned. 
The Utopian approach appears more reasonable and morally superior to 
the piecemeal approach. But the former is a dangerous one. In order to 
recognize how dangerous it is， we must illuminate one aspect contained in 
it: that is， uncomρromising radicalism. According to it， we must go to the 
very root of the social evil， and completely eradicate the wicked social 
system. This kind of exhaustiveness can appeal to man's aestheticism. 
Most people would prefer making a new dress of new cloth to keeping an 
old garment badly patched. It is not surprising that people think likewise 
about institutions. But the uncompromising radicalism applied to institu-
tions and human beings could invite a disaster. Because， ifthe view that 
only constructing a really beautiful new world held significance would 
dominate， human beings would be reduced to being the means for satisfy-
ing the desires of idealist who， inspired by aestheticism， would want to con-
struct UTOPIA at any cosL 
* * * 
1 assert that those who try to defend the open society must resolve to live 
in a imperfect and badly patched society. We are morally imperfect. 
Our knowledge about the means to accomplish our ideals is badly 
limited. But it is a fact that there are several standards of values in this 
(27) Popper， K.R.， ibid， pp.164-165. 
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world that hinders construction of a impecable and really beautiful world. 
Those who devote themselves to the ideal of the open society must not 
deplore the fact that there are several standards of values. In addition to 
this， they must continue to do their best lest disagreements between stan-
dards of values should lead to violence. 
